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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20010988-CA

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Manuel Samora replies to the state's brief as follows.
Arguments not addressed in this reply brief were either adequately addressed in
Appellant's opening brief or do not merit reply.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Samora did not invite the trial court's error in imposing a harsher punishment on
remand. The clear implication of defense counsel's sentencing statements was that the
fine be reduced as a tradeoff for imposing restitution.
State v. Babbell. 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (Babbell ID does not allow
imposition of a harsher sentence on remand under the circumstances of this case.
Babbell II involved an illegal sentence which was void whereas this case involves the
correction of error caused by the imposition of sentence in an illegal manner. Babbell II
states that "[w]hen a criminal defendant successfully appeals a conviction or sentence,
§ 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of a new and harsher sentence based on the same

conduct." Id (emphasis added). While Babbell did not successfully appeal his sentence,
Samora did successfully appeal the error in imposing sentence and therefore fits squarely
within the prohibition against harsher sentences on remand of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-405 (1999) and due process. Unlike Babbell II. allowing the imposition of a
harsher sentence under the circumstances of this case would have a chilling effect on the
exercise of the right to appeal.
The increased sentence is also not permissible under the due process and section
76-3-405 exception which allows for an increase under certain limited circumstances.
The state misstates this exception when it argues that an increased sentence is permissible
if the facts were not actually known to a sentencing judge at the time of the original
sentencing and the record discloses information which supports the increase. In order to
meet due process requirements, the record must disclose conduct by the defendant after
the original sentencing which justifies the increase. Unless such conduct is part of the
record, possible vindictiveness at resentencing and fear of retaliation are injected into the
decision of a defendant to appeal a sentence which is imposed in an illegal manner.
In this case, there is no information in the record suggesting any conduct by
Samora after the original sentencing which would justify an increase. Moreover, even if
the state's test were considered, the sentencing judge had at least constructive knowledge
of the restitution information since it was discussed at the plea hearing and was part of
the record. The sentencing judge's failure to familiarize himself with the record or the
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details of the case, especially where that failure contributed in part to the error in
sentencing, does not work in favor of finding a lack of knowledge on the part of the
judge.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE SENTENCING JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING A
HARSHER SENTENCE FOLLOWING REVERSAL ON APPEAL.
A. SAMORA DID NOT INVITE THIS ERROR.
Prior to indicating that some restitution was owed in this case, defense counsel
requested that the sentencing judge waive the fine. R. 122:3-4. The implication of
defense counsel's statement, when read as a whole, is that counsel asked the judge to
lower the fine and in lieu of the original fine, impose restitution. R. 122:3-4. Defense
counsel's statement does not indicate that an increase in the total amount overall is
permissible. Instead, the statement merely suggests a tradeoff between the originally
imposed fine and restitution.
B. IMPOSITION OF HARSHER PUNISHMENT IS NOT
PERMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE.
Relying on Babbell II, the state argues that the illegal sentence was void and
subsequent imposition of a more severe sentence is therefore permissible. 813 P.2d at
88. Contrary to the state's argument, however, a more severe sentence is not permissible
in this case where Samora's original sentence was overturned on appeal because it was
imposed in an illegal manner.
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In State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (Babbell I \ the Court vacated
the sentences and remanded for resentencing because the trial court had imposed illegal
sentences. Although the convictions required minimum mandatory prison sentences, the
trial court had imposed sentences of five to life without imposing the minimum
mandatory sentence. After the state pointed out during oral argument that the sentences
which had been imposed by the trial court were not authorized by statute, the Supreme
Court vacated the illegal sentences. On remand, the trial court imposed the statutorily
authorized minimum mandatory sentences.
In Babbell II, the Court recognized that section 76-3-405 "was intended to protect
the right of a criminal defendant to appeal, not to prevent the correction of a sentence
unlawfully imposed.1' 813 P.2d at 87. It also recognized that f'[w]hen a criminal
defendant successfully appeals a conviction or sentence, § 76-3-405 prohibits imposition
of a new and harsher sentence based on the same conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
Prohibiting the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals
the sentence "is appropriate because federal '[d]ue process of law . . . requires that
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new [sentencing].5" Id., quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656
(1969).
The Court further explained that federal due process and the importance of the
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state constitutional right of criminal defendants to appeal require that a harsher sentence
not be imposed following a reversal on appeal.
In State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), this Court held
that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being imposed in
a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction.
That constitutional policy is particularly compelling in this state because
there are two explicit state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to
appeal, Article I, section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah
Constitution and Article VIII, section 5. A defendant's constitutional right
to appeal is further protected by § 76-3-405. The purpose behind these
provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right which
the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might
be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction. This Court has
stated:
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting
out erroneous judgments. That purpose is not promoted by
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his
conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence
for having done so. An erroneous judgment of conviction is as
much an affront to society's interest in the fair administration of
justice as it is to an individual's rights.
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980).
I d at 88.
Although imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals
his sentence violates due process and section 76-3-405, it did not violate due process or
the statute in Babbell II because the defendant had not successfully appealed his
sentence. Id Instead, the Court recognized while the case was on appeal that an illegal
sentence which was more lenient than that which was authorized by statute had been
imposed, and vacated that il1 ^gal sentence. The Court reasoned that section 76-3-405
and due process were not violated under the circumstances of Babbell II because it is
5

unlikely that vacating an illegal sentence will have a chilling effect on the right to appeal
and the illegal sentence is void and can be corrected at any time. Id.
Nevertheless, the principles underlying Sorensen, Chess, Pearce,
and § 76-3-405 have no application in this case. The correction of an
illegal sentence stands on a different footing from the correction of an error
of conviction. First, a defendant is not likely to appeal a sentence that is
unlawfully lenient, and there is, therefore, minimal chilling effect on the
right to appeal.
Second, § 77-35-22(e) specifically provides that because an illegal
sentence is void, a trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
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While correction of an illegal sentence stands on a different footing than
correction of an error of conviction, correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner does not. Imposing a harsher but statutorily correct sentence after an illegal
sentence is vacated does not have a chilling effect on the right to appeal, whereas
allowing imposition of a harsher sentence after the defendant has successfully appealed a
sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner does have such an effect. If the trial
court were permitted to impose a harsher sentence after a defendant demonstrated on
appeal that the manner in which the sentence was imposed violated statutory and
constitutional protections, defendants like Samora who are sentenced in an unlawful
manner would not appeal their convictions for fear the trial judge would impose an even
harsher sentence following a successful appeal. The appellate purpose of ferreting out
erroneous judgments in which sentences were imposed in an illegal manner would not be
furthered by allowing trial courts to impose harsher sentences after the original sentence
6

is vacated on appeal because it was imposed in an illegal manner. Since there is a
chilling effect on the rights of criminal defendants to appeal sentences imposed in an
illegal manner if the trial court is allowed to impose a harsher sentence after the
defendant demonstrates on appeal that the manner in which the sentence was imposed
violated statutory and constitutional protections, due process and section 76-3-405
prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals.
See Id.
In this case, Samora successfully appealed his sentence, claiming that it was
imposed in violation of due process and Utah R. Crim. 22(a). State v. Samora. 2001 UT
App 266 (unpublished). To allow the trial court to impose a harsher sentence after
Samora successfully appealed his sentence would allow the type of vindictiveness and
fear of retaliation which was at the root of the Court's concern in Pearce . See Pearce,
395 U.S. at 725. It would discourage defendants from appealing sentences which are
imposed in an illegal manner, undermine justice by allowing sentences which are
imposed in an illegal manner to be carried out without challenge, and serve as "'an
affront to society's interest in the fair administration of justice'" as well as Samora's
rights. Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88, quoting Chess, 617 P.2d at 343. Babbell II does not
allow for the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals the
manner in which the sentence was imposed, and due process and section 76-3-405
mandate that a harsher sentence not be imposed under such circumstances.
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The state argues alternatively that even if the trial court was "subject to the 'no
harsher sentence' rule," imposition of a harsher sentence was permissible in this case
because the increased sentence was based on facts not known to the trial court at the time
of the original sentence and the record discloses the basis for the increased sentence.
State's brief at 10-12. According to the state, the exception section 76-3-405(2)(a) was
met because when the judge originally imposed sentence in violation of due process and
Rule 22(a), he did not know that restitution was at issue, and at the resentencing, he
solicited testimony as to the amount due.
Contrary to the state's argument, the circumstances of this case do not fit the
exception set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 or required by due process. Moreover,
there would be a tremendous chilling effect if judges could impose a harsher sentence at
resentencing under the circumstances of this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a) states that the statutory rule against harsher
sentences does not apply when "the increased sentence is based on facts which were not
known to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places
on the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence . . . . " Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a). This exception must be interpreted to comply with the due
process requirement that an increased punishment cannot be imposed on remand unless
the record affirmatively indicates that the increased sentence was based on conduct by
the defendant after the original sentencing which justifies such an increase. Pearce , 395
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U.S. at 726.
In this case, there was no conduct by Samora after the original sentencing and no
other change in circumstances which would justify imposition of a harsher sentence on
remand. Imposition of a harsher sentence cannot therefore be upheld.
In addition, any information regarding restitution was known prior to the original
sentencing and was part of the record. At the very least, the sentencing judge should
have known at the original sentencing that imposition of restitution was a possibility not
only because restitution is always a consideration at a criminal sentencing, but also
because of the nature of the conviction. Had the judge paid any attention to the details of
the case at the original sentencing, he would have considered whether restitution should
be imposed. Moreover, the judge had constructive if not actual knowledge of the
possibility that restitution could be imposed in this case because the record discloses that
restitution was discussed at the plea hearing. R. 63:3. The judge's failure to familiarize
himself with the details of the case, particularly where those details are a matter of
record, does not satisfy the requirement that the information was not known to the court.
In this case where the possibility that restitution would be imposed was evident at the
original sentencing and the record established the details of the restitution, the facts
regarding restitution were known to the court at the time of the original sentencing. The
facts of this case therefore do not fit the lack of knowledge requirement of the exception
found in section 76-3-405(2)(a).
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This case also does not fit the second requirement for the exception found in
subsection 2(a) because the sentencing court did not affirmatively place on the record
facts which would justify an increased sentence. This second requirement for application
of the exception mandates that the judge detail any conduct by the defendant or any
change in circumstances or other justification for imposing an increased sentence. In this
case, the record does not disclose any basis for imposing an increased sentence. Instead,
the record merely indicates the amount of restitution requested by the state and lays out
why restitution would have been appropriate at the original sentencing. Because the
record does not contain any information which would justify an increase at resentencing,
the harsher sentence violated due process and section 76-3-405.
Allowing an increase in punishment under the circumstances of this case would
allow judges to act vindictively after a sentence is vacated on appeal by imposing a
harsher sentence then articulating facts which were available but not discussed at the
original sentencing. Additionally, allowing an increase under these circumstances would
create a fear of retaliatory motivation which would have a chilling effect on the exercise
of the right to appeal. Unless an increase is clearly based on conduct by the defendant
after the original sentencing, sentencing judges will be free to scour the case for negative
information in an effort to justify an increased sentence, and defendants might refrain
from appealing an error because of a fear that a harsher sentence will be imposed if they
prevail. Since due process mandates that neither vindictiveness nor the fear of retaliatory
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motive can play any part in resentencing, Pearce and its due process underpinnings
require that the increase in this case not be upheld where it is based on information which
was known and part of the record at the original sentencing. See Pearce. 395 U.S. at
725-26.
Finally, without any citation to case law or analysis of any type, the state claims
the increase did not violate due process. State's brief at 12. The state's entire discussion
regarding the exception to the due process prohibition against increased punishment is as
follows:
Further, because the increased sentence was based on facts that were
not known at the time of the original sentence, the increase had a
permissible, non-retaliatory basis. The increase therefore did not violate
due process.
State's brief at 12. The state's claim that the increased punishment qualified for an
exception to the due process requirement that a sentence not be increased after it is
vacated on appeal is not adequately briefed and should therefore be rejected. See Utah
R. App. P. 24; State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, the
state ignores the clear requirement of Pearce that in order to comply with due process, the
record must disclose conduct by the defendant after the original sentencing which
justifies the increased punishment. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
When a judge imposes a harsher sentence following reversal on appeal, due
process is violated unless there is "objective information concerning identifiable conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
11

proceeding." IcL at 726 (emphasis added). The factual details of the conduct by
defendant which occurred after the original sentencing must be part of the record "so that
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal."
Id. In this case, there is nothing on the record indicating conduct by Samora after the
original sentencing which would justify an increased sentence. The state's reliance on
information regarding restitution which occurred prior to the original sentencing, was
known at the time of the original sentencing, and was a matter of record does not meet
the constitutional requirements set forth in Pearce. The imposition of a harsher sentence
on remand where the record does not disclose conduct by Samora after the original
sentencing which would justify such an increase violates due process.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Manuel Samora respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the illegally imposed restitution order.
SUBMITTED this jx* day of August, 2002.

( jk^Q}> LJCBLZS
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JOHN K. WEST
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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